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*Approved & changes  
on page 18  
per M-62*

## COMMITTEE ON IMAGERY REQUIREMENTS AND EXPLOITATION

COMIREX-M-59

9 January 1969

The following is an index of the Minutes of the 9 January 1969 COMIREX Meeting:

- Page 4 Special Briefing I - Preview of Problems which Might be Encountered in Photo Reconnaissance of Mobile Soviet Strategic Missile Systems
- Page 7 Special Briefing II - Soviet Satellite Coverage of Eastern Europe

### Section I (Approval of Minutes, Briefings, and Reports on Operations)

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### Section II (NPIC Report)

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- Page 21 Report from Imagery Collection Requirements Subcommittee
- Page 21 Report from Imagery Exploitation Subcommittee
- Page 21 Report from Data Base Working Group

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GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM  
AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING  
AND DECLASSIFICATION

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
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Section III (cont'd)

Page 22 Report from Exploitation Research and Development Subcommittee

Section IV (Action Items)

None


Section V (Status of Recent COMIREX Papers)

None

Section VI (Other Business)

Page 23 Graphics for Basic Exploitation Reports

23 West Coast Trip, 2-7 February 1969

24 Employment of 

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
Tabs

Page 25 Tab A - Coverage of Far Eastern Requirements for the Period 1-31 December


Page 27 Tab B - Coverage of North Vietnam 26 December 1968 - 1 January 1969



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


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

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# COMMITTEE ON IMAGERY REQUIREMENTS AND EXPLOITATION


Minutes of Meeting Held in Auditorium

Building 

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1000-1300, Thursday, 9 January 1969

PRESIDING




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
Chairman

MEMBERS PRESENT

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Special Briefing I

Preview of Problems which Might be Encountered in Photo  
Reconnaissance of Mobile Soviet Strategic Missile Systems

1. The CIA member introduced [ ] explaining that he was an author of a working paper "Soviet Concept of Strategic Missile Mobility" which would be the subject of his briefing. The following comments are not a summary of the briefing as this will be disseminated to the community within a few weeks as an Intelligence Memorandum. The information and conclusions presented by [ ] were derived from all sources. The comments given below are confined to the perspective of photo reconnaissance, using [ ] and [ ] as examples of what may be observed and what kind of a contribution photo reconnaissance can make.

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a. Overhead reconnaissance has not detected the deployment of [ ] has not been observed at any test range or possible area of deployment. Deployment may take place at former MRBM launch sites where fan-shaped pads have appeared but as yet there is no evidence of [ ] association with these pads.

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b. In August 1968, a [ ] was seen at Plesetsk providing the first indication that missile testing was in the offing. As yet, no flight test program has been associated with the [ ] however, the [ ] was observed in an area of the rangehead associated with solid propellant missile development and it is believed that the [ ] is a solid propellant missile.

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c. We have not seen the [ ] outside its canister so that we are uncertain about the characteristics of the missile. Based on a technical analysis of the lifting capability of the [ ] we believe that the missile is liquid,

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probably the 500 nm SS-12. Overhead photography has been extremely successful, however, in spotting [redacted] at facilities along the Sino-Soviet border. We have pinpointed deployment of the support base and permanent launch sites at three locations, as well as three alternate field sites near two of them. We have no evidence of operational planning or the full range of mobility for this system except an assumption that, if several support type vehicles observed at one facility are essential to launching the [redacted] mobility and rapidity of launch would be less than Soviet boasts.

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2. [redacted] continued with the suggestion that, whereas the Soviets have made mobility a characteristic of many of their systems, it is clear that they also have recognized that firing from fixed sites has definite advantages. The initial introduction of rockets into Cuba demonstrated mobility but photography showed that they were converting rapidly to fixed sites. Photography of North Vietnam has shown that the mobility of SAMs is used in the southern sectors where surprise, camouflage, and concealment are considerations of overriding importance. However, in the industrial areas around Hanoi and Haiphong where maximum fire power, minimum reaction time and a highly integrated defense are essential, the system is emplaced in fixed sites.

3. The section of [redacted] briefing explaining mobility options (rail, road, or off-road) suggested that rail is the option on which there has been the least identifiable Soviet work to date. It was suggested that support areas would be the prime targets for overhead photo surveillance designed to produce information on either road or off-road deployment options. Even though the total mobile missile force might not be at a support base at any one time, it should be possible to develop indicators which would permit a judgment as to

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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the size of the force that a missile base could support. Indications of surveyed sites from which missiles could be fired would, of course, need to be reported and would continue to be important information for U.S. strike forces but would not necessarily be a direct indicator of the number of Soviet weapons. With regard to support bases, [REDACTED] emphasized that the support requirements would be considerably larger for mobile forces than they would be for the same number of weapons at fixed sites.

4. At the conclusion of the briefing, [REDACTED] emphasized that although achievement of true mobility is not an easy matter the Soviets have at least paid considerable attention to it. This would suggest that those planning an overhead photo reconnaissance program must anticipate a need to detect signs of the presence or absence of such deployment and develop indicators which will permit some measurement of the size and potential strike capability of a mobile force. The Chairman observed that the briefing had been most helpful and indicated to him that, although the capability of satellite reconnaissance to detect mobile missile deployment would be taxed, the task was by no means hopeless.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Section I (Approval of Minutes, Briefings, and Reports on Operations)

Approval of Minutes

(S)

1. COMIREX-M-57 was approved with the following corrections:

a. Page 17, paragraph 4, 3rd line from bottom: "the" should be "other" in front of "priorities for U-2".

*page 18, para 6, line 8.*  
*C.F.* [redacted] <sup>also</sup> asked that a new <sup>third</sup> ~~fourth~~ sentence be added to follow ". . . needs to know". This sentence is to read: "If our intelligence posture in this regard is not acceptable, the matter should be pursued in other forums". Continue with next sentence.

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*6d.* Page 18, paragraph 6: [redacted] wished to add a phrase following ". . . the use of the U-2" in the eighth line from the bottom of the page. The phrase should read: ". . . in terms of intelligence likely to be gained".

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2. Approval of COMIREX-M-58 was deferred until next week, pending the submission of changes desired by the CIA member and the NRO consultant. The following corrections may be made at this time:

a. Page 3 [redacted] CIA, should be listed under Members Present and [redacted] CIA, should be listed under Consultants Present.

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b. Page 4, paragraph 1: Reference should have been made to COMOR-D-13/70.1 in both the third and eighth lines.

c. Page 8, paragraph 2: [redacted] requested that the phrase "in error" be stricken from the last line since, at the time the later date was reported, it was not in error.

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Operational Briefing--Satellite

[redacted]

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3. [redacted] reported the projected satellite  
schedule as of 9 January.

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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

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CORONA

1106 - Scheduled 5 February 1969

Estimated 1st bucket recovery - 13 February 1969, 1730L

Estimated 2nd bucket recovery - 20 February 1969, 1730L

Film processing/distribution:

Estimated arrival 1st bucket at Eastman Kodak - 14 Feb, 1300L

Estimated arrival 1st bucket Priority 1 in D.C. - 17 Feb, 1100L

Estimated arrival 1st bucket Priority 2 in D.C. - 18 Feb, 1100L

Estimated arrival 2nd bucket at Eastman Kodak - 21 Feb, 1300L

Estimated arrival 2nd bucket Priority 1 in D.C. - 24 Feb, 1100L

Estimated arrival 2nd bucket Priority 2 in D.C. - 25 Feb, 1100L


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Projected stereo coverage:

1st bucket - Land area - 1.68 million sq. n.m.  
Targets - 2,400

2nd bucket - Land area - 1.68 million sq. n.m.  
Targets - 2,400

1050 - Scheduled 19 March 1969

Estimated 1st bucket recovery - 27 March 1969, 1730L

Estimated 2nd bucket recovery - 4 April 1969, 1730L

Film processing/distribution:

Estimated arrival 1st bucket at Eastman Kodak - 28 March, 1300L

Estimated arrival 1st bucket Priority 1 in D.C. - 31 March, 1100L

Estimated arrival 1st bucket Priority 2 in D.C. - 1 April, 1100L

Estimated arrival 2nd bucket at Eastman Kodak - 5 April, 1300L

Estimated arrival 2nd bucket Priority 1 in D.C. - 8 April, 1100L

Estimated arrival 2nd bucket Priority 2 in D.C. - 9 April, 1100L

Projected stereo coverage:

1st bucket - Land area - 2.80 million sq. n.m.  
Targets - 2,400

2nd bucket - Land area - 2,80 million sq. n.m.  
Targets - 2,400

1051 - Scheduled 7 May 1969

Estimated 1st bucket recovery - 15 May 1969

Estimated 2nd bucket recovery - 23 May 1969

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1107 - Scheduled 9 July 1969

Estimated 1st bucket recovery - 18 July 1969

Estimated 2nd bucket recovery - 27 July 1969

4. The Chairman commented that an experiment using color on one side, 2,000 feet, and black and white on the other will be conducted on 1106.

Report on Aircraft Activities--Far East

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5.  reported GIANT SCALE activities for the period 20 December 1968 - 9 January 1969 as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>MISSION NO.</u>	<u>AREAS/TARGETS</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
20 Dec	GS092	Seg Rtes 10, 1A, 15; Seg RR 1, 4, 5; Dien Bien Phu Afld, Yen Bai, Tuyen Quang, Tien Yen, Vinh, Ben Thuy	Results Fair
24 Dec	GS093	Cam Pha Port, Lang Son, Dong Dang, Lao Cai, Kep, Hon Gai Port	Results Fair
29 Dec	GS094	Hoa Lac, Xom Afld, Ammo Stor, Seg Rtes 1A, 101, 15; RR 7, 4, 6, Vinh Afld, Ben Thuy Transpt Pt	Results Good
30 Dec	GS095	Cam Pha Port, Hon Gai Port, Ha Tou Boat Rpr, Kep, Yen Bai, Tuyen Quang, Lang Son, Dong Dang, Port Wallut, Tien Yen	Results Good

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6. During the period 20 December 1968 - 9 January 1969, [ ] reported 25 successful BUMPY ACTION missions and two losses. Following this report, the Chairman asked if there was any explanation for the seeming improvement in the number of successfully recovered drone missions or if the drones were just getting luckier.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>MISSION NO.</u>	<u>AREAS/TARGETS</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
20 Dec	Q838 (Low)	Haiphong, Kien An, Nam Dinh, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Rte 1A	Successful, MARS
20 Dec	Q252 (High)	DMZ, Mu Gia Pass, Rtes 15, 1A, Bai Thuong, Vinh	Successful, MARS
21 Dec	Q224 (High)	Rtes 10, 1, Nam Dinh, Thanh Hoa RR Bypass, Ben Thuy Port	Successful, MARS
22 Dec	Q875 (Low)	Kien An Afld, Kep Afld	Successful, MARS
24 Dec	Q859 (Low)	Rte 15	Successful, MARS
24 Dec	Q878 (Low)	DMZ, Rte 1, Dong Hoi Afld	Successful, MARS
26 Dec	Q243 (High)	DMZ, Rtes 1A, 101, 15, Vinh Compl Thanh Hoa, Bai Thuong	Successful, MARS
26 Dec	Q880 (Low)	Nam Dinh, Thanh Hoa, Ile Bac Long	Successful, MARS
27 Dec	Q823 (Low)	Rtes 74, 15, Wtrway 19, Bai Thuong	Successful, MARS
27 Dec	Q877 (Low)	Bac Mai Afld, Gia Lan Afld, Yen Vien RR Yd	Successful, MARS
28 Dec	Q879 (Low)	Ile Bach Long	Successful, MARS
29 Dec	Q852 (Low)	Area So of Tchepone, Cable Crossing and Ford, 1712N/10609E, Revetted Truck Park	Successful, MARS

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29 Dec	Q855 (Low)	SAMs 66, 71, 93, Haiphong Port, Cat Bi Afd	Successful, water recovered
30 Dec	Q871 (Low)	Sam Son Coastal Def Site, Bai Thuong Afd, Thanh Hoa Transp Pt, Seg Rte 1A, Vinh Afd	Successful, MARS
30 Dec	Q881 (Low SRE)	Nam Dinh TPP, Nam Dinh Trans Pt, Bac Mai Afd, Gia Lam Afd	Successful, MARS
31 Dec	Q869 (Low)	Ben Thuy Port, Rte 15, 1A, WW 5, Dong Hoi Afd	Successful, MARS
1 Jan	Q252 (High)	DMZ, Mu Gia Pass, Rtes 15, 1A, Bai Thuong Afd, Vinh Compl	Successful, MARS
1 Jan	Q847 (Low)	Gia Lam Afd, Bac Mai Afd, Nam Dinh TPP, Nam Dinh Transp Pt	Successful, MARS
2 Jan	Q867 (Low)	Phuc Yen Afd, Yen Vien RR Yd, SAM Site 73	Lost
2 Jan	Q873 (Low)	Rtes 1A, 15, WW 9A, 11B, Vinh Son Compl	Successful, MARS
3 Jan	Q857 (Low)	Rte 1A, Nam Dinh TPP, Nam Dinh Trans Pt, Ninh Vinh RR Br, Thanh Hoa	Successful, MARS
3 Jan	Q834 (Low)	Nam Dinh TPP, Nam Dinh Trans Pt, Seg RR 4, Phu Ly RR Yd, Bai Thuong Afd	Successful, MARS
4 Jan	Q858 (Low)	Ninh Binh Compl, Seg Rte 1A, Phu Ly Compl, Seg Haiphong-Hanoi RR & Hwy, Kien An Afd	Successful, water recovery

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4 Jan	Q824 (Low)	Rte 1A	Successful, MARS
5 Jan	Q870 (Low)	Haiphong Port, Haiphong Naval Base, Haiphong RR Yd, Kien An Afd, Seg Rte 10, 4, 1A, Nam Dinh Trans Pt, Thanh Hoa Trans Pt	Successful, MARS
8 Jan	Q873 (Low)	Rte 1A, Seg Rte 15, WW 9A, 11B, Vinh Son Compl	Successful, MARS
9 Jan	Q857 (Low)	Seg Rte 1A, Nam Dinh TPP, Nam Dinh Transp Pt, Ninh Bien RR Br, Thanh Hoa Compl	Lost, crashed on recovery

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7. [redacted] reported that IDEALIST/TACKLE Mission C278C was flown on 19 December. This was an "H" Camera mission in the Formosa Strait area. The standdown continued on FOOD FAIR activities.



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8. [redacted] reported attempts to cover the two priority South China/North Vietnam requirements as shown below:

a. Coverage of Lines of Communications (LOC) pertinent to the introduction of Chinese forces into North Vietnam (see COMOR-D-25/207, 4 March 1966). The number of LOC priority targets in South China and North Vietnam remains at 142. For the period 2-8 January 1969 no surveillance coverage was reported.

b. Coverage of North Vietnam to detect the possible introduction or deployment of offensive missile systems (see COMOR-D-25/200, 23 May 1967, and COMIREX-D-25.3/2, 20 November 1967) is shown on the grid map at Tab B for the period 26 December 1968 - 1 January 1969. Four BUMPY ACTION missions flown during this time period and considered successful have not been reported. No SSM activity was observed.

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
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Report on Aircraft Activities -- Cuba



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9. [redacted] reported that there had been a surge of GLASS LAMP activity just before the holidays and that the program had resumed with a successful mission on 8 January.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>MISSION NO.</u>	<u>RESULTS</u>
20 Dec	G059	Successful, 6.9% coverage
21 Dec	G060	Successful, 9.0% coverage
22 Dec	G061	Successful, 27.9% Coverage
8 Jan	G062	Results unknown

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
<u>DATE</u>	<u>MISSION NO.</u>	<u>NET</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE</u>
20 Dec	G059	6.9%	68.9%
21 Dec	G060	9.0%	73.2%
22 Dec	G061	27.9%	78.3%

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10. [redacted] reported that for the 56-day period beginning 14 November 1968 ten GLASS LAMP missions were flown over Cuba and provided 93 percent coverage of the area. During this period 173 of the 178 targets in Cuba were covered completely on cloud-free photography not including the most recent mission flown 8 January.

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


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
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Section II (NPIC Report)

Mission Highlights



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1.  showed the following briefing boards:



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

b. USSR. Mission 1049 revealed that the large unique transporter dock in Komsomolsk Shipyard 199, empty when last observed in September 1968, is now occupied by an unidentified object. The object is estimated not to exceed three-quarters of the available space inside the dock. The inside dock dimensions are 487 feet by 54 feet.

c. China. Identification of a third BADGER (TU-16) on Mission 1049-2 photography of the Hsian Airframe Plant Yen Liang 172 may indicate production of BADGERs at that plant. Prior to this mission, China was known to have two BADGERs acquired from the Soviets. On this mission, two BADGERs were observed at Hsian Airframe Plant Yen Liang 172 and a third at the normal home base for these aircraft, Wo Kung Airfield.

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


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f. North Vietnam. Photography of a secondary road leading into Nam Dinh depicts the movement of eight heavily camouflaged T-34/85 tanks. In the past, these tanks have usually been observed in the armor training areas around Vinh Yen and Bai Thuong. This is the first time the tanks have been observed in transit outside these areas, although PT-76 tanks were used during the siege of the Khe Sanh combat base in February 1968.

g. Laos. The final briefing board showed troop movement along Route 15/151 24 n.m. north-northeast of Mu Gia Pass. This was the largest number of military personnel, approximately 600, ever observed on a known infiltration road leading into Laos. The troops were traveling southeast in a single column along a trail roughly paralleling Route 15.

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Section III (Subcommittee and Working Group Reports)

Report from Imagery Collection Requirements Subcommittee

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1. [ ] mentioned that the report on coverage of Far Eastern requirements for the period 1-31 December would be distributed with the Minutes. (See Tab A)

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Report from Imagery Exploitation Subcommittee

2. The Chairman, EXSUBCOM, reported two subcommittee actions in connection with film distribution:

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a. The Subcommittee has reviewed and restated distribution requirements for satellite-acquired domestic/engineering photography and has cut the number of copies required by about 50 percent.

b. In the future, the processor will be able to package domestic/engineering pieces of film in composite rolls. This will speed up processing as well as facilitate handling by the recipients.

3. EXSUBCOM has approved the requirement for the production of SITDs on ten ground force installations, all in China.

Report from Data Base Working Group

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4. [ ] reported that the IPIR/SUPIR format as revised and approved at the last COMIREX meeting has been distributed. (Reference COMIREX-D-31.2/14)

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5. Target Nomination Forms have been disseminated to requirements officers with tentative instructions on how to fill them out. Instructions are the same as those originally attached to the COMIREX paper (COMIREX-D-32.2/4, Tab A-2).

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Report from Exploitation Research and Development Subcommittee

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6. The Chairman, EXRAND, reported that progress is being made by the Technical Task Team reviewing the community exploitation R&D program. One significant item to come out of this survey is that between CIA and DIA there is at present a cumulative total of exploitation R&D projects of common interest of about [redacted] and that this is being added to at the rate of about one hundred projects per year. This figure does not include any procurement.

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7. [redacted] who has been serving as Chairman of the Task Team, is resigning from the Agency effective 15 January and that the chairmanship of the Team will be assumed by [redacted] [redacted] introduced [redacted] to COMIREX and invited him to make any comments he desired.

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8. [redacted] told COMIREX that the first assignment of his Task Team had been to pull together a comprehensive FY 69 - FY 70 line item list of all exploitation R&D that agencies having representatives on EXRAND are doing. This list shows how much money is going where. The list is organized by program category aligned toward the COMIREX-approved objectives. Copies will be available for distribution when it comes from the printers. The next order of business for the Task Team will be to prepare a consolidated community view on color. [redacted] said that he has recommended to [redacted] that NPIC continue to provide a chairman for the Technical Task Team and closed by saying that he would miss this particular phase of his work very much.

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
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
9. The Chairman expressed appreciation to [redacted] for his contribution to COMIREX and wished him well in his new work.

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


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## Section VI (Other Business)

### Graphics for Basic Exploitation Reports

1. The DIA representative commented on the fact that NPIC is given responsibility in the National Tasking Plan for preparing graphics for use in the Basic Exploitation Reports and that he thought NPIC was doing a fine job in this respect. The Chairman endorsed [redacted] comments and added his commendation to NPIC on the quality of the graphics.

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### West Coast Trip, 2-7 February 1969

2. [redacted] gave a rundown of the proposed schedule for the West Coast trip for approval of the members. Because of transportation difficulties, it was generally agreed that plans to include Edwards in the itinerary should be dropped but that the trip to Beale to see the SR-71 should still be included. The Chairman told [redacted] that the schedule, as he had outlined it, sounded fine and then reminded members that, in view of the limited number of persons who could be accommodated on this trip, they should get their nominees in to [redacted] as soon as possible. Each agency will be responsible for arranging transportation to and from the coast by commercial air. It is not certain how transportation will be handled while on the Coast, so orders should be cut to allow for side travel and rental car in case this should be necessary.


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
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
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


Executive Secretary

Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation

Attachments  
Tabs A and B

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

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
Tab A

AREA	Total Tgts. in Area	Required Frequency	Tgts Covered in Require- ment Period	Percent Covered	Req Satis- fied	REMARKS
South China	330	Monthly	50	15	NO	Reporting Period 1-31 Dec. 68
Manchuria	270	50% - 6 Months	93	34	NO	
		Near 100% - 12 Months	155	57	NO	
Central China	673	50% - 6 Months	268	40	NO	
		Near 100% - 12 Months	390	58	NO	
Formosa Strait	117	Monthly Sampling (CHINAT Requirement)	3	-	*	
S.I B	40	Near 100% - 12 Months	35	88	NO	
N Korea	244	50% - 3 Months	61	25	NO	
		Near 100% - 6 Months	70	29	NO	

\*Chinese Requirement for coverage of this area also satisfies U.S. requirements.

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